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We consider an artificial world of two interdependent economies which 
produce differentiated commodities and accumulate human capital. 
Commodities are traded and human capital production depends on country- 
specific public expenditure and world-wide knowledge. Public goods are 
differentiated in terms of their relative yields of consumption and 
production services. The terms of trade link between countries gives rise to 
negative policy spillover effects on welfare whilst the externalities in human 
capital production account for positive policy spillover effects on welfare. 
We study optimal policy as the equilibrium outcome of a dynamic game 
between benevolent governments. We show that, whilst welfare is never 
lower, growth may either be higher or lower under cooperation than under 
non-cooperation depending on the extent to which public goods are 
differentiated and the relative strengths of different cross-country 
externalities.
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Beginning with the seminal contribution of Romer (1986), the new growth 
theory has produced many important insights into the growth and 
development processes of economies.1 Not least of these insights is the role 
of public policy in determining growth activity. By endogenizing this 
activity, the theory has demonstrated the considerable potential for 
governments to influence growth incentives and affect long-run 
development through changes in fiscal, monetary, financial and trade 
regimes. Moreover, there is now overwhelming evidence of these policy 
effects on growth in real-world economies.2 In this paper we study the link 
between policy and growth from a relatively new perspective. Using a 
model of two interdependent economies, we examine the international 
welfare and growth implications of cooperative and non-cooperative policy 
making. We show that cooperation, whilst never reducing welfare, may 
either promote or retard growth depending on the nature of public services 
and the source of cross-country externalities.
A minimum condition for generating sustainable growth is a production 
technology which is homogeneous of degree one in those factors that can be 
accumulated. This is the basis of all endogenous growth mechanisms and is 
often motivated by considering some form of (private or public) externality 
which converts decreasing returns (to accumulable inputs) at the individual 
level to constant returns at the aggregate level. In the model of this paper the 




























































































on two types of externality: a country-specific, publicly-provided input; and 
a cross-country, disembodied-knowledge transfer, together, these account 
for positive policy spillover effects on welfare and growth. We treat policy 
as endogenous, being determined as the equilibrium outcome that 
maximizes social welfare. This is in contrast to the exogenous and ad hoc 
treatment of policy in much of the existing growth literature. Here, we deal 
only with optimal policy.
Our analysis bears on the issue of international policy coordination which 
draws attention to the strategic aspects of policy design in a world of 
interdependent economies. There is a large literature on this issue, the basic 
message of which is that non-cooperative behaviour on the part of national 
governments leads to inefficient outcomes because of a failure to take 
account of cross-country externalities; by internalizing these externalities, 
cooperation is a means of improving efficiency.3 Two shortcomings of the 
literature are, first, that most of the models are ad hoc and, second, that all 
of the models describe stationary economies. Consequently, the welfare 
implications are weak and the gains from cooperation may be seriously 
understated if growth effects are present. In this paper, the issue of policy 
coordination is addressed using a maximizing model with growth. Two 
recent contributions which make the same innovations in different 
frameworks are Blackburn and Ravn (1993) and Devereux and Mansoorian 
(1992). In the former it is shown that coordination unambiguously raises 
both welfare and growth. In the latter it is shown that coordination raises 
welfare but may either increase or decrease growth. We build on these 




























































































Our model describes an imperfectly-competitive world of two 
interdependent economies in which households invest in human capital and 
consume differentiated commodities produced at home and abroad. The 
government of each economy produces two types of (tax-financed) public 
good which are differentiated according to their relative yields of 
consumption and human capital services. In contrast to the positive 
externalities in human capital accumulation, the terms of trade link between 
countries gives rise to negative policy spillover effects on welfare. The 
solution of the model is an inefficient competitive balanced growth 
equilibrium in which growth rates converge regardless of the distributions 
of taxes and initial human capital stocks. Per-capita income levels converge 
if taxes are the same across countries. We study optimal fiscal policy 
(optimal taxation or the optimal provision of public goods) as the 
equilibrium outcome of a dynamic game between governments. We show 
that, whilst welfare is never lower, growth may either be higher or lower 
under cooperation than under non-cooperation. The ambiguity depends on 
the degree of differentiation between public goods and the relative strengths 
of different spillover effects. We illustrate our results with some numerical 
simulations.
The model is set out in Section 2. Section 3 contains a description of the 






























































































We consider an artificial world of two symmetric economies, indexed by k 
-  1,2. In each economy there is a continuum of monopoiistically- 
competitive firms within the unit interval and a constant population 
(normalized to one) of identical, infinitely-lived households endowed with 
perfect foresight.4 Each firm produces a differentiated commodity, indexed 
by i e(0,l), using the services of labour (human capital) hired from 
households. Each household consumes goods produced at home and abroad, 
and allocates its time between leisure, work and human capital production. 
There is a sovereign government of each economy which raises revenue 
from taxation to finance its purchases of commodities. These purchases are 
used to provide public goods and services which substitute (imperfectly) for 
private output and contribute to human capital development. Time is 
discrete and indexed by t = 0,1,...,°°.
A. Public Sector Production and Consumption
We distinguish between different types of public good according to their 
relative yields of consumption and production services. For simplicity, we 
confine ourselves to the case of two (composite) public goods which the 
government of country-1: provides to its citizens in the amounts G„ and 
db . By production services we mean services to the production of human 
capital, as in Blackburn and Ravn (1993). Devereux and Monsoorian (1992) 
consider the case of publicly-provided inputs (e.g., the maintenance of 




























































































As regards human capital creation, one may wish to think of a broader range 
of services, including the provision of information through such means as 
government publications, public libraries and national museums.
We denote by gh(i) and &,(/') country-/: government’s purchases of 
domestically-produced commodity-/ which are used in producing Gkl and 
, respectively.6 We assume that public production takes place according 
to the following CES technologies:
(1) Gb=(.\'ogta(i)°di)''°, £ „ = ( £ * = u
where a  6 [0,1], a  - 1 being the elasticity of substitution.
Government expenditures are financed from (domestic) income tax 
revenue.7 Total labour income in country-* is given by WtlmklHtl , where Wk, 
is the nominal wage and mk,Hk, is total labour input which is the product of 
total time devoted to working, mkl , and the aggregate stock of human 
capital, Hk, . Following Devereux and Mansoorian (1992), we assume that 
expenditures on different public goods are financed separately and define 
the flat-rate income taxes r„ and Bt, . Hence, if Pk,(i) is the price of 
commodity-/' produced in country-*, then the government of country-* faces 
the budget constrains




























































































The duty of each government is to provide public services efficiently. This 
amounts to a two-stage decision problem which may be stated as follows: 
first, for any given quantity of public good, select those purchases of 
commodities which minimize expenditure; second, having disposed of cost 
minimization, choose that quantity of public good which maximizes social 
welfare. The first problem is standard and solved to yield the following 
government demands for commodities:
(3) gb(‘) ■
0»
£ ^ 0 ) "
a, k = 1.2
where ££ = JP„(j)gb(j)dj, §> =\PkIU)&(j)dj and Qb = I Pb(j)ana'"dj. The 
second problem requires consideration of private sector behaviour and is 
attended to subsequently in our analysis of dynamically optimal fiscal 
policies.
B. Private Sector Production, Consumption and Human Capital 
Accumulation
The representative household in country-/: consumes cki,(i) units of 
commodity-/ produced in country-/ and exhausts available time (which is 
fixed and normalized to one) on work, mk, , human capital production, nk, , 





























































































(4) Ut k,l = l2 lk * l
1=0
where
(5) tt( ) = log[(C^C',)(l-mto-« tl)e(G'(?:-£)*] k,l = 1,2; k * l
(6) Ca, =(\'oCkl,(i)adi)Ua k,l = 1,2
such that p,n,d,£,<t> e (0,1). We assume that households substitute goods and 
services intertemporally with unit elasticity and discount the future at the 
rate (1-/?)//). The important parameters in equation (5) are the share of 
expenditure on domestically-produced commodities which determines the 
extent of terms-of-trade spillovers, e (the weight on specific public good 
consumption services which differentiates public goods) and <p (the weight 
on composite public good consumption services). The formulation of the 
consumption indeces, Cut, in equation (6) implies that the elasticity of 
substitution between commodities is the same for households as it is for the 
government.8
A country-fc household enters each period with a stock of human capital, hkl. 
It faces the budget constraint




























































































and produces new human capital according to
(8) A*., k.l -  1,2: k * l
where 77, £17/, <5 e (0,1), 77 + iff + 5 e (0,1) and A > 0. Equation (8) is a 
generalization of the human capital production technology considered in 
Blackburn and Ravn (1993). There are decreasing returns to each input, 
individually, but constant returns to scale overall. The important parameters 
are E, (which differentiates public goods according to their production 
services), iff (which determines composite public input good productivity) 
and 1 - 77 - iff - 8 (which governs the extent of cross-country knowledge 
spillovers).9 The technology implies that there are both national and 
international externalities in the production of human capital which depends 
on aggregate outcomes (Gb, G^, Hb and Hk,) that the representative 
household treats rationally as beyond its control.
Given equation (5) and (8), we make an arbitrary distinction between 
different public goods by assuming that This implies that a one
percent change in Gt has at least the same percentage effect on human 
capital production relative to utility as a one percent change in G1,,. In other 
words, Gb is more specialized in yielding production services and du is 
more specialized in yielding consumption services. The two extreme cases 
are when e = £ = 0.5 (two identical public goods) and when e = 0 and £ = 1 




























































































The decision problem of a household is to choose the sequences 
(^(0)7=0,{cu,(«'))r=o.K};„.K)r=o and 1̂ 17=0Which maximize utility and 
are feasible. In doing this, the household makes forecasts of, and takes as 
given, the sequences { f j ; 0,{ iJ7=0,{C jr=o,{^)r=0.{WJ7^ and {//„ }“0 • 




+P V (hb+\iG b+],G b ,j, Tb+l ,TJtI+1 ,H b+t ,H ll+,)}
s.t. (7) and (8); given ha k,l = 1,2; k *  l
where V( ) is the value function. The dynamic program has a well-defined 
solution which is derived in the Appendix. The solution implies the 
following relationships describing aggregate household behaviour:
. nEbPu(i)'lf°-" _ (1
( ID )  <:„,(/) = --------- -------------. c b,(i)-----------------------------------a, a
(11) mb =m = 1-77/3 VP




























































































(12) = An\G id'-i )'" K 6»';"-*-6
k,l = 1.2; k * l
where Ek, = jPkt(j)Ckkt(j)dj + fPi,(j)cki,(j)dj. Equation (10) gives the demands 
for domestic and foreign commodities. Equation (11) shows that the 
fractions of time (m,n e (0,1) devoted to work and human capital 
production are the same in each country, being constant and independent of 
policy and growth. Equation (12) describes aggregate human capital 
accumulation.11
The monopolistically-competitive manufacturer of commodity-/' in country- 
k employs mk,(i)hk,(i) units of labour to produce yk,(i) units of differentiated 
product according to the constant returns to scale technology.
(13) yk,( i) = mkt( i)hk,( i) k = 1,2
The firm’s total costs are equal to variable labour costs, Wk,mk,(i)hkl(i), plus a 
fixed cost, k. The firm chooses the price, Pkl(i), which maximizes profits 
subject to y*(i) = ct t (0 + ̂ (0 +  £,,(/)+ &(/), given equations (3) and (10). 
The result is the standard constant mark-up rule
w(14) Pu(i) = Pb =-*- k = 1,2a





























































































Our prototype world economy has a perfect foresight equilibrium in which 
all decisions are optimal and feasible, and all forecasts are realised. The 
equilibrium is inefficient due to the presence of externalities, distortionary 
taxation and imperfect competition. It is constructed as follows.
By virtue of symmetry (in particular, equation (14)), the commodity index, i 
e (0,1), can be dropped from all variables. Hence, from equations (1), (3), 
(6) and (10), we have
=  S h  — ££ / P k i» = ifL = I  P U ’ Oil = CUi = I  f 'ki
Cu, = cUl = (l -  n)Eb / P„ . The expenditure terms in these expressions follow
from equations (2) and (7) as
= Pl,&,) = i l,wlamHt1 and
Eb(= pt,cua = - i b)Wt,mHk, , where we have also made use of
mk, = m from equation (11). Appropriate substitution in equation (12) 
reveals that aggregate human capital accumulation satisfies
(15) Hm  = k,l = 1,2; k * l
where Z = An"(am)r.
The growth rate of country-/: is given by HkH.i/Hkl. As in Blackburn and 




























































































there is cross-country convergence of growth rates regardless of the 
distributions of taxes and initial human capital stocks. The irrelevance of 
initial human capital is accounted for by the international spillovers of 
knowledge which imply that the economy with the least human capital has 
the highest rate of return to human capital investment. This insight is 
credited to Tamura (1991) but, unlike the model in that paper, the 
framework developed here does not predict automatic convergence of per- 
capita income levels: for this to occur, tax rates must be the same across 
countries.13
Each economy is subject to the same balance of payments constraint. Since 
there are no (physical) capital flows between countries, this is equivalent to 
the balance of trade equilibrium condition Jpk,(i)cikl(i)di - JPi,(i)cki,(i)di = 0. 
From this, together with our previous expressions, we obtain
(16) — (1~T, )//|,
P„ (1 -X k, - ^ ) H b
k.,l=\,2\k*l
which determines the terms of trade, where the ratio on the right-hand-side 
measures relative real expenditures in the two countries.14
Given the above, we may write the household’s momentary utility function 
in equation (5) as u( ) = v( ), where




























































































+(l-jU)(log[(l-T„ - 3 „  )H„]~ l o g [ ( l - f „  - d j H J )
+0£log[r„ tf J  + k j  = 1,2; k *  I
such that X =log[^'‘( l- / i )1‘"(am)lt*(l-m -n)s]. Equations (15) and (17) 
reveal the trade-offs in fiscal policy. On the one hand, higher domestic 
taxation means more public good consumption and production services 
which makes domestic households better off both directly (in the present) 
and indirectly (in the future) through greater human capital accumulation. 
On the other hand, higher domestic taxes means less (current) disposable 
income which makes domestic households worse off. The international 
dimensions to the problem are manifested in the cross-country spillovers in 
human capital production and the terms of trade. The spillovers in human 
capital production (accounted for by the term in equation (15))
imply that there are positive externalities from taxation. The spillovers 
through the terms of trade (reflected in the term (1 - |0,)( ) in equation (17)) 
mean that there are negative externalities from taxation. In providing public 
goods efficiently, the government of each country must optimally take 
account of these aspects of policy. The trade-offs involved mean that 
maximizing welfare is not the same as maximizing growth: growth, itself, 





























































































A benevolent government maximizes social welfare by maximizing the 
utility of the representative household. It does so by choosing policies for 
tax rates which optimize the intertemporal trade-off between current and 
future income (consumption). This dynamic optimal taxation problem is 
made interesting by the interdependence between countries associated with 
the human capital and terms of trade spillover effects. Because of this 
interdependence, growth and welfare in each country are determined by the 
fiscal policies of both countries.
The problem is solved as the equilibrium outcome of a dynamic game 
between governments. The game may be played either cooperatively or non- 
cooperatively. In the case of cooperation, governments choose tax strategies 
together so as to maximize a joint welfare function, taking account of the 
cross-country externalities. In the case of non-cooperation, governments 
choose tax strategies separately so as to maximize their own welfare 
functions, taking as given the tax strategy of each other. We distinguish 
between two types of non-cooperative environment: by “isolationist” we 
mean a situation in which each government also takes as given the 
production of human capital in the other country; by “strategic” we mean 
the case in which each government recognizes the effects of its policies on 
human capital production abroad.15 For simplicity, we assume that 
countries are endowed with the same initial stock of human capital, Him = 





























































































Let P*NI, P‘NS and PfC denote the problems facing the government of 
country-^ under “isolationsist” non-cooperation, “strategic” non­
cooperation and cooperation, respectively. These problems are defined by 
the functional equations
„ ... II lei A. _ _
(18) P/W:V* 5,„«„,//„)
» “ to+l j
„ ... 11 Id A. _ _ _ _ _
(19) P/"s:V*(Hto,W(1) a .Mr* ,T„, 5, „ / / , .« ,)
„ 11 Id A.
(20) P*C:V«( » „ ,» , )  -, _ ,  „  {v(Tt,,5 t,,T„,3„.W4,,W„)
+V(T„ , 5, , , » . , ) + pv • ( ) }
s.t. (15); given /0 k,l = 1,2;
where V*(-) is the value function of the government. In P’"' the government 
chooses policies for rb and i kl which maximize its own welfare, given 
the policies of the other government and ignoring the spillovers in human 
capital production. In P*NS the government solves the same problem but, 




























































































governments choose policies together so as to maximize an equal-weighted 
world welfare function, taking into account all externalities.16
The problems are solved in the Appendix to produce perfect Nash 
equilibria, where the optimal tax rates in each case satisfy f „ = f e (0,1) and 
(0,1) such that f  + Be (0,1); equilibrium policies are constant and the 
same in both countries. It follows from equation (15) that each country 
experiences the same (time invariant)equilibrium rate of growth given by
Using equation (17), the value of welfare in each country may be expressed 
as
where X'= X +(l + 0)log(//o) + /3(l + 0)log(Z)/(l-/)).17 It is evident that there 
are no transitional dynamics in the model. Both economies are always on 
the balanced growth path and everything is determined once initial human 
capital is known.




























































































The precise expressions for equilibrium tax rates are summarized in Table 1. 
We emphasize the dependence on certain key parameters, namely £, £  /r 
and i 2. Recall that the parameters £ and £ determine the degree of 
differentiation between public goods and that the parameters /u and Q 
govern the strengths of cross-country externalities. The extent to which 
these externalities are taken into account explains the differences between 
optimal policies. Taking account of the terms of trade spillovers means that 
the prospect of reducing the current costs (future benefits) of taxation by 
causing a current improvement (future deterioration) in the terms of trade is 
eliminated. Taking account of the human capital spillovers means that the 
prospect of raising future benefits through greater world-wide human capital 
accumulation is realised. “Isolationism” and cooperation define opposite 
extremes, producing policies which mix together in the intermediate case of 
“strategic” non-cooperation. The internalization of externalities under 
cooperation is clearly visible in the valuations of the quantities z°( ) and 
TJ( ). It is straightforward to show that countries are never worse off under 
cooperation than under non-cooperation.18 This result is not surprising but 
the fact that our model admits growth means that the quantitative gains from 
international policy coordination may be very different from those 
suggested so far in the literature.
The interesting results of the paper relate to the growth implications of 
policy coordination. Our main finding is that growth may either be higher or 
lower under cooperation than under non-cooperation depending on the 




























































































different cross-country externalities. In Table 2 we report the qualitative 
effects of parameter variations on equilibrium taxes. In Table 3 we report 
the results of comparing equilibrium taxes. Since higher taxes (higher 
public services) mean higher growth, the conclusion to be drawn is that 
growth is more likely to be higher under cooperation than under non­
cooperation the more specialized are public goods (the smaller is e and the 
larger is £), the more potent are human capital spillovers (the smaller is 12) 
and the less potent are terms of trade spillovers (the larger is fi). The 
intuition is as follows.19
The two spillover effects exert opposite forces on optimal policies. On the 
one hand, the spillovers through human capital production imply positive 
externalities on welfare which tend to bias non-cooperative tax rates 
downwards. On the other hand, the spillovers through the terms of trade 
imply negative externalities on welfare which tend to bias non-cooperative 
tax rates upwards. Whether taxes (and hence growth) are higher or lower 
under cooperation than under non-cooperation depends essentially on which 
of the spillover effects dominates. The precise magnitudes of these effects 
on equilibrium taxes depend on the degree of public good specialization. 
Under non-cooperation, greater specialization makes both the effect of 
human capital spillovers on r and the effect of terms of trade spillovers on 
5 relatively stronger. Since the more productive policy (?) suffers a greater 





























































































Confirmation of the above reasoning is provided by the results of limiting 
cases, reported in Table 4. These are the cases of no human capital 
spillovers ( £2 -  1), no terms of trade spillovers (/i = 1), zero public good 
specialization ( e = £ = 0.5), complete public good specialization (£ = 0, q = 
1) and, additionally, no public consumption goods (0 = 0). Where no 
inequality appears between terms, the ranking of these terms remains 
ambiguous. In the case of £2 = 1 (/i = 1) the presence of only negative 
(positive) policy spillovers means that growth is never higher (lower) under 
cooperation than under non-cooperation. On moving from the case of £ = £ 
= 0.5 to the case of £ = 0, t, = 1 the ranking of growth rates shifts in favour 
of cooperation. For the case in which 0 = 0 ,  terms of trade spillovers have 
relatively little influence so that cooperation never produces inferior growth. 
These results may be compared with those obtained by others. In the 
framework of Devereux and Mansoorian (1992) the ranking of cooperative 
and non-cooperative growth rates depends essentially on the elasticity of 
intertemporal substitution such that an elasticity equal to (or greater than) 
one establishes the ranking in favour of cooperation. This dependence 
disappears when public goods yield only production services, in which case 
cooperative and non-cooperative outcomes (including welfare levels) 
coincide. In our model the ranking of growth rates depends on other factors 
and is generally ambiguous even though there is unit elasticity. Also, the 
coincidence of outcomes in the case of 0 = 0 requires the additional 
restriction that £2 = 1. In the framework of Blackburn and Ravn (1993), the 
absence of terms of trade spillovers means that cooperation necessarily 




























































































[i = 1 and replicate the results exactly after setting 0 = 0 and £ = 1. As a 
final observation, we note that the differences between “isolationist” and 
“strategic” non-cooperative outcomes vanish when £2 = 1 since there are 
then no human capital externalities either to ignore or to take account of 
(which is what distinguishes these cases).
To gain an idea of the quantitative differences between alternative 
scenarios, we have simulated the model under a range of parameter values 
around a benchmark set of {f3 = 0.956, /t = 0.750, a  = 0.920. 9 = 0.466, E =
0.350, 0 = 0.022, A = 1.547, 77 = 0.750, £ = 0.650, y/ = 0.022. <5 = 0.114). 
This benchmark is the product of a calibration based on an average annual 
rate of growth of 1.7 per cent and an average total rate of taxation of 25 per 
cent across cooperative and non-cooperative regimes."0 Unless otherwise 
stated, deviations from this benchmark are the result of varying each 
parameter in turn, holding all other parameters constant. Two types of 
normative analysis are conducted. The first is a straightforward comparison 
of welfare levels across regimes. The second involves finding the 
percentage reduction in consumption each period which reduces the level of 
welfare in one regime to the level in another.21 Our results, summarized in 
Table 5 and Figures 1 - 4, show that, depending on parameter values, the 
growth and welfare effects of cooperation can be sizeable. Of course, the 
results are meant only to be illustrative rather than definitive, especially 




























































































Table 5 contains the results for the benchmark case. There is as much as an 
18 per cent reduction in growth and a 2.5 per cent reduction in welfare 
(equivalent to a 1.3 per cent decrease in consumption each period) on 
moving from cooperation to “strategic” non-cooperation. The costs become 
greater still on moving to the “isolationist” environment, there being a 
further 70 per cent reduction in growth and a further 33 per cent reduction 
in welfare (equivalent to a further 15 per cent decrease in consumption each 
period).
Figures 1 - 4 illustrate the effects of deviations from the benchmark in terms 
of cooperative and “strategic” non-cooperative outcomes. The effect of 
increasing (decreasing) fi is to increase (decrease) both the growth and 
welfare gains from cooperation which are maximized at /i = 1 (Figure 1). 
The value /j. * is the critical point at which cooperative and non-cooperative 
growth rates coincide: successively lower values of fi below fj * lead to 
successively higher rates of growth under non-cooperation. Similar 
observations are made for variations in 1 - £2 (Figure 2).22 Both the growth 
and welfare costs of non-cooperation are increasing in this parameters with 
1 - £2 * being the critical value at which cooperative and non-cooperative 
growth rates are equal and below which successively lower values of 1 - £2 
lead to successively higher rates of growth under non-cooperation. 
Together, these results for /i and 1 - £2 suggest that one needs either 
relatively large terms of trade spillovers or relatively small human capital 
spillovers for non-cooperation to have a growth advantage. This need not be 




























































































pairs of jli and 1 - O  might equalize cooperative and non-cooperative 
growth rates. It is possible to see this simply by varying both /j and 1 - X2 
simultaneously around their mid-values (Figure 3). Finally, the effects of 
varying e and ^ are illustrated for the case in which fj. < /j * so that growth 
is initially lower under cooperation than under non-cooperation when these 
parameters are at their benchmark values (Figure 4). Starting from the 
position of e = £ = 0.5 (zero public good differentiation), the effect of 
decreasing e and increasing <jj (that is, increasing the degree of 
differentiation) is to raise cooperative growth at a faster rate then non- 
cooperative growth such that the former overtakes the latter beyond some 
critical point, £ *(£*) .
5. Conclusions
This paper is intended both as a contribution to the new growth literature 
and as a contribution to the international policy coordination literature. Its 
contribution to the growth literature is the endogenization of policy in an 
endogenous growth model such that policy is determined optimally as the 
equilibrium outcome that maximizes social welfare. Its contribution to the 
policy coordination literature is the incorporation of growth effects into a 
model of strategically-interdependent economies engaged either in 
cooperative or non-cooperative behaviour. We believe that the analysis 




























































































policy coordination is counter-productive, might not the costs of 
coordination be much greater in a growth model than in a non-growth 
model? And likewise, if, in the absence of precommitment, time 
inconsistency leads to inferior discretionary equilibria, might not the costs 
of non-commitment be much larger if growth effects are present than if they 





























































































1. Subsequent major contributions include Lucas (1988), Grossman and 
Helpman (1989, 1991a) and Romer (1987, 1990). For surveys of the new 
growth theory, see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) and Grossman and 
Helpman (1991b).
2. For surveys of this evidence, see Easterly and Rebelo (1992) and Fischer 
(1992. 1993).
3. See, e.g. Canzoneri and Henderson (1988), Jensen (1994), Levine and 
Currie (1987), Miller and Salmon (1985) and Oudiz and Sachs (1984). 
Some authors (e.g. Kehoe 1990; Rogoff 1985) have constructed models in 
which cooperation can be counter-productive. This arises when there are 
strategic interactions not only between governments but also between 
governments and private agents. Fischer (1987) provides a survey of the 
literature.
4. The assumption that population is constant and the same in each country 
is not entirely innocuous. As pointed out by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995). 
in almost any model with externalities there are scale effects which mean 
that growth is increasing in population. By precluding these effects (which 
do not directly concern us and which can be disputed empirically), we 
ensure that the model has a steady state equilibrium in which both countries 
grow at the same, constant rate.
5. This was originally studied by Barro (1990) in the context of a closed 
economy.
6. The assumption that each government purchases only domestically- 
produced output is made largely for simplicity. The implications of relaxing 
the assumption are commented upon when appropriate.
7. Thus, as in Blackburn and Ravn (1993) and Devereux and Mansoorian 





























































































8. Our assumptions ensure tractibility without too much loss of generality. 
Since there is unit intertemporal elasticity of substitution and /} e (0,1 i, 
utility is bounded under constant geometric growth.
9. The inclusion of H, , , the aggregate stock of human capital abroad, was 
first motivated by Tamura (1991) as reflecting a system of imperfect 
property rights in the acquisition and transmission of knowledge across 
countries.
10 . The first case is more-or-less equivalent to that of e = £ = 1 which 
reduces to the specification in Blackburn and Ravn (1993) when n = 1 and 
0= 0. The second case is considered by Devereux and Mansoorian (1992).
1 1 .  The properties of the time allocations are specific to logarithmic utility. 
A more general CES preference structure would make the model less 
tractible without substantially altering the main results.
12. The simple price-setting rule in equation (13) is a result of our 
assumption that households and governments substitute between 
commodities with the same elasticity. Relaxing the assumption would 
complicate the analysis without changing the basic message of the paper.
13 . These results may be established as follows. Define //', = log(//*,) - 
log (Hi,) and r' = ) -  log(f„3[,‘?). From equation (14), we have
#,'+1 =(2(ri + ii/ +S)-\)H' + tit’ . Since ri,if/,5 e (0,1) and 77 + i/r+<5 e  (0,1), 
we know that |2(rj + y/ + S) - 1| e (0,1) so that this difference equation is stable, 
generating monotonic (cyclical) convergence if r\ + i// + 5 > 1/2 (rj + y/+ 5 
< 1/2). If tax rates are constant , the solution is
H,' = (2(77 +1// + 5) -1)' + tjt' / 2(1 -  rj -  y/ -  S). Hence,
h;„ -  h; = (2(r?+1)/+5) -  o' w0'2(t)+V7+s —n so that iim.,_ (//;„ -  //;>=o, 
implying convergence of growth rates. If taxes are the same across 
countries, f  = 0 so that lim.,_ H' = 0, implying convergence of per-capita 
income levels.
14 . It is here where our assumption that governments purchase only 




























































































assumption, then the effect of government expenditures on the terms of 
trade would make the analysis considerably less tractible.
15 . “Isoltionaism” would describe the case of an irrational government or a 
government of a small open economy. In the case of “strategic” non­
cooperation, a government takes account of the fact that, by affecting 
human capital production at home, its policies have spillover effects on 
human capital production abroad which, in turn, have spillover effects back 
on domestic human capital production.
16 . The equal weighting assumption is not only convenient but also 
appropriate, given our assumption that countries are endowed with equal 
initial stocks of human capital.
17. Equation (22) establishes that U is bounded so that the problem is well- 
defined, as we claimed earlier.
18 . Observe that equilibrium welfare in equation (22) is maximized when
f = [j3v/£(l + 0) + 06(1 -  /?)] / (1 + m  -  P -  Pv) and
B = [Py (\-Z)(\ + iI>) + <I>(,\-e)(\-P)]/(\ + <l>)(\-P~ Py) which are precisely the 
cooperative equilibrium policies, f c and ¥  .respectively.
19 . We maintain the assumption made earlier that £ > e. The effect of 42 on 
and 5“  is positive (negative) if (1 - £) ( /i + 0) >(<) 0(1 - £).
20. Given 1.7 per cent growth, the discount factor, (5, is assigned a value 
consistent with an annual real rate of interest of 6.4 per cent. The value of fi 
is chosen to reflect a 75 per cent share of consumers’ expenditure on 
domestically-produced goods. Setting the average output share of 
government expenditure equal to 23 per cent, and given the average total tax 
rate of 25 per cent, we infer the value of a  from the government’s 
consolidated budget constraint (the sum of the constraints in equation (2)). 
The extent to which public goods are differentiated is chosen subject to the 
restriction £ = 1 - ^ . The magnitude of t) is selected so as to make the 
externalities in human capital production small, while the restriction S = 
1.005(1- 42) is imposed so as grant knowledge spillovers within a country 
slightly more influence than knowledge spillovers across countries. 




























































































average of these, we set 0 = y/ and compute its implied value. Under the 
assumption that the share of time devoted to market work is 25 per cent, 
equation (11) is used to value 9 . This leaves the technology parameter. A, 
which is evaluated by taking the average of equation (21) across regimes.
21. This is calculated as follows. By appropriate substitution, we may write
«(■) = u(), where
V( c u , r ,a ,/ / J  = log[((l-/i)///)'-"(l-m-n)6(am)*] + log[c„,(?£3l-cH J°. Taking 
any pair of regimes - 1 and 2, say - we compute the quantity n  which 
satisfies the condition '£ \0P'v(c'Ul( \ - n ) , ' i ' ,H 'U ) = oP .
Since consumption grows at a constant rate, n  is determined such that 
agents are indifferent between (1) the tax rates under one regime and (2) the 
tax rates under another with a 100 x n per cent reduction in consumption 
each period. The computation can be made using the formula
log(l-tf) = log((l-f: - f f ) / ( l - ? '- 3 1)) + [£0 + £/ty(l + </>)/(l-/J)]log(?J / f ')
+ [(l-£)0 + ( l-S )M l + 0)/(l-j3)]log(ff/31) = (l-/))(U2- t / ') ,  where U is 
given in equation (22).
22. Variation in Q are the result of variations in 8 (rather than variations in 
77 or y/) which do not affect any other aspects of the equilibrium. The range 
of variations is forced to satisfy the condition 8 > 1 - Q  > 0, given the 





























































































A. The Household’s Problem
Problem Pk, defined in equation (9), is solved as follows. Let 
V(|t + s) = V ( h , Hb„ , H («'Vu, (iWi +
J (i)cu,(I)di = (1 -  t„ -  )Wlumuhu and = n, / (1 -  mb -  nb ). In addition, 
observe that dhû  / dnta= r]hUtl lnk, and 3ht,tl ldhb = r\hu+l / hh . The marginal 
conditions may be expressed as
(Al) =(>Ph(0
k̂kJ
(A2) c ^ ^ \ ',  = çbpit(i)
(A3)
(A4) p d V ( ] t  + \ ) d h M  
<&*,+> d n u




where £k, is the multiplier on the budget constraint. Equations (Al), (A2) 
and (A3) are the static optimality conditions, where the terms on the left- 




























































































respectively. Equation (A4) establishes the equality between the current 
marginal cost and discounted future marginal benefits of nk, , where the 
future benefits accrue from the effect on human capital, dhb̂  / dnb . 
Equation (A5) gives the marginal value of /i*,+i which contributes to future 
welfare through the effect dhbf2 / dhbtl.
Conditions (Al) and (A2) imply the relative commodity demands
The same equations may be integrated and combined to yield f  „ = 1 / Eu . 
By appropriate substitution, the expressions for q *,(j) and c*/,(i) in equation
(10) are obtained.
Combining conditions (A4) and (A5) yields the difference equation




(A8) PnNM - N b = ^




























































































B. The Government’s Problem
Problems P*"', PkgKS and PtC, defined in equations (18). (19) and (20), are 
solved following the procedure set out in Blackburn and Ravn (1993). Let 
V'(]t + s) = V*(HkI„,Hl,.,), 7L=?b / ( l - ? b - S j  and ^ ^ / ( l - r ^ - d j . I n  
addition, observe that
/dT„=V&tl.l /T = y r ( \ - ^ H ^ I^ .d H ^ /d H ,
= £2Hb+2 / and /<?«„=( 1 -  £2)tf , where £2 = r\ + i// + j3.
For problem , the optimality conditions are
(Bl) ffijV * (-|t + 1) cWtl<l
(B2) p  f l ( l - e )
1
(B3) <jV, (-|t + D = /i + 0 ^ V g(-lt + 2 ) ^ ,  
<̂ *♦1 <^*1
Equations (Bl) and (B2) equalize the net current marginal costs and 
discounted future marginal benefits of rkl and respectively, where the 
future benefits accrue from the effects on human capital dHkltl / dxk, and 
dHUtl /dBu . Equation (B3) gives the effect of Hut, on welfare as the sum of 
the effects on current and discounted future utilities, where the future 




























































































additional effect of human capital spillovers, dV‘ (•)/ + 2) / dHllt2 )(<?//,1+, / Hb.,), 
is ignored since each government assumes that oW„+2 / cW ,̂ = o in this 
problem.
Conditions (Bl) and (B3) may be combined to produce
The solution to this difference equation is
MO-pa)
Together with equation (Bl) and (B2), it is straightforward to solve for the 
values and 3“ given in Table 1.
For problem P*NS, the optimality conditions are (B1), (B2) and 
<9V*tlf + n  II4.A R P V U \t  + T t M  R J V * ( \ t  + T tP U
(B4)




























































































Here, the effect of HkI+t on welfare is given by equation (B6) which 
incorporates the effect of SHhtl / dHu^ as governments now take account of 
the human capital spillovers. Equation (B7) shows how these spillovers 
affect welfare through the terms of trade (accounted for by the quantity 
(l - n)H,:+1) and future human capital production at home and abroad (the 
terms dHb+3 / dH„+2 and dH„., / dH,lt2).
Conditions (Bl), (B6) and (B7) can be consolidated into the difference 
equation
(B8) /J2(l- 2£l)futl +2/3£iftI,.1 -Tu
PvZKn + </>)( 1 -  ftQ) + P( 1 - MX 1 ~ 0 )1+m  1 - /?)(1 + P ~ 2/fo)
Given the characteristic roots A] and A2, the homogenous part of this 
equation can be written as
(B9) (y32(l -  2C2)Z,2 +2/KIL'' - l) f to = -(l-A ir ') ( l-A 2r l)ft,
where L is the lag operator and A, = 1M, (/ =1,2). The roots are A, = l/p  and
A2 = l/[5(2£2- 1). Hence, the solution is
0  -  + 0)(1 -  flfl) + /?(1 -  /J)(l -  Q)] + <pe(\-P)(l + P -  2/Xi)
H(l-P)(l + P-2pCl)
which, in conjunction with equations (Bl) and (B2), yields the expressions 




























































































Problem Pc delivers the following optimality conditions:
(B ll) 1 *  *1».
d T b
(B12) 1 0(1-£) [ pdVs(\t + DdH^
(B 13 ) _ 1 + 0 , p d V g ( \ t  + 2 ) d H Ut2 t p d V * ( \ t  + 2 ) d H , ^
*/*♦. //btl + + awM 3hm
(B14) ^ 8(-|f + i) 1 + » < PdV^\t + 2)dH ^  < fffl"(jn-2)a/,,.,
»*♦* »*..
Governments choose tax policies jointly and all externalities are 
internalized. The absence of fi from these expressions reflects the 
internalization of terms-of-trade spillovers, whilst the welfare effects of Hkl 
+1 and Hh +, reflect the internalization of human capital spillovers.
By appropriate manipulation of conditions (Bll). (B13) and (B14), the 
following difference equation is obtained:
(B15) j32(l- 2Q)fbt, + 2/K2fb+1 - Tb =




























































































This has the same homogeneous part as equation (B8) so that equation (B9) 
applies and the solution is
(B16) f  -  + ̂  +





























































































Table 1 Equilibrium Tax Rates
Non-cooperation
_  T°(e,g ,/r .f l)
T '(/i.Q)
T ° ( l - e , l - g , / i . Q )
(1 -  /?)T°(£,g ,/i ,fl)  + 0(1 -Q )T °(£ ,g , l , l )  
( i -^ )T ' (M, t i )  + i 3 ( i - n ) T ' ( i , i ) - / 3 ( i - i 3 ) ( i - a ) ( i - ) u )
( i - ^ ) T 0( i - £ . i - j , / i . n ) - t - ^ ( i - n ) r 0( i - £ , i - g , i , i )  
(1 -  P ) t '  i n , Q )  +  >3(1 -  Q)r' (1,1) -  j8(l -  0)(1 -  Q)(l -  f i )
Cooperation
, c r°(£ ,g ,l , l )
r'd.l)
y  _ T ° ( l-£ ,1 -& 1 ,1 )
T1 (1,1)
r ° (e ,4 ,n ,n )  = PvZin + <p) + £0(1 -  011)
T'OUl) = (/i + 0)(l-012 + /ty) 

























































































































































































Table 3 Comparisons of Equilibrium Tax Rates
< \~H < l'(£,£,fi)
t c L t ns if £  V ( £ , £ f l )  + r (£ .£ .Q )
< l - / i  < l'(£,£,£})
y i * »  if A» } t° ( l-£ , l -<^ .Q )
( i - / j < i'(i-£ ,i-^ ,n )
j c ^ ns jf ju ^ i ° ( l - £ , l - g . f l )  + r ( l - £ . l - g . f l )
< l - / i  < I1 (1 - £,1 —
f “ = f w if ( l - Q X ( P + 0 ) $ - 0 £ ) = O  
5 W= 3 M if ( i - n x ( / i  + ^ ) ( i - | ) - 0 ( i - £ ) = o
I°(£ ,^n) = £0(1- /3Q)(1 -P  + Pv) + 00 > (  1 -  fl)(£0 -  £(1 + 0)) 
[' (£,£,£2) = 0V(1 -QX1 + 0X1(1 + 0) -  £0) 




























































































Table 4 Equilibrium Tax and Growth Rates in Limiting Cases
a n  c  (o,i) £2 = 1 0 = 1
e,i<j) e (0,1) t “  = t ns)t c
= a"s >ac
j,M _ y NS) y c
f ' " < f VS(TC
a A,,, a A,s<ac
y m, y m{y e
e = £ = 0.5 f *  = r “ ) f f 
= 3 » ) ?
j,»' _  y fl's )y c
f  w ( f V5{ r< 
3 M(3'vs<3r
y M { y m(yC
£ = 0, £ = 1
y N' { y NS , y c
r  M = f  "s = x c
3 W = 3"s > ?
yW _
t n' ( t ns(t c
y N‘ { y NS{y c
0 = 0 JW _
3 M = = 5°
y™ = y"S = yC
V " ( t ns( t c
a w <avs<ar




























































































Table 5 Simulation Results for Benchmark Parameter Values
Cooperation Non-cooperation
“Strategic “Isolationist”
Optimal tax f 0.213 0.172 0.086
0.121 0.102 0.058
Growth rate 0.024 0.020 0.006
Welfare 11.404 11.098 7.466
% decrease in growth rate 18.022 70.094
%  decrease in welfare 2.684 32.730
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